केस विवरण
The Oversight Board will address the two cases below together, choosing either to uphold or overturn Meta’s decisions on a case-by-case basis.
The Board has selected two cases involving content supporting Iranian government security forces. These cases will assess how Meta deals with content that could be generated by coordinated inauthentic behavior, such as state-sponsored influence operations.
Both pieces of content were posted by accounts with a code in their usernames that is associated with a pro-Iranian hacking group. Both accounts were also created less than two months before the content was posted. These signals, when combined with the nature of the content, suggest that these posts could be part of an online influence operation. The Board selected these cases to investigate how Meta treats content that may be part of such operations, especially those being carried out by state-sponsored actors.
The first case involves an image of a man in military-style clothing posted to Instagram in June 2025 with a caption in Farsi reading: “فقط كمي صبر #ايران (Just a bit of patience Iran).” Text over the image states: “صداي اتحاد مردم ايران تن و بدن تون رو داره ميلرزونه اره؟ به امام حسين دنيارو به شوك ميبريم ما با لباس رزم ميخوابيديم منتظرتون بوديم (The sound of the Iranian people’s unity is making your bodies tremble, isn’t it? By Imam Hussein, we will drive the world into shock. We have been sleeping in our combat gear, we’ve been waiting for you).” The content was viewed over 140,000 times and received approximately 5,000 likes and fewer than 1,000 comments before the account was later disabled.
In early January 2026, another Instagram user posted a short video of what appears to be a motorcycle convoy of Iranian government security personnel driving through a city with the caption in Farsi: “ما تا آخر جان فدای این کشور و نظام هستیم (We are devoted and will sacrifice to this country and regime until our last breath).” The caption also included a series of hashtags, including #Iran, #Special_Unit, #Protest and #Unrest. The video is set to music with a voice singing a message similar to that of the caption, claiming they will sacrifice their lives for Iran and the regime. The content has been viewed over 6,000 times, receiving over 300 likes and fewer than 50 comments.
Multiple users reported both pieces of content to Meta. The company determined that neither post violated any of its policies, leaving them on Instagram. A user then appealed to the Board, saying both posts form part of a coordinated attempt to promote and normalize violence as well as act as “coercive propaganda” which implicitly threatens Iranian dissenters.
The Board notes that from late December 2025 until late February 2026, there were large anti-government protests across Iran. The Iranian government responded with force, and the protests intensified. In early January, around the time that the motorcycle convoy content was posted, the protests peaked in size and force. Security forces responded by carrying out mass killings and the government also shut down internet access nationwide. Protests continued until mid-January, with a second round of demonstrations starting in February, shortly before the U.S. and Israel commenced military strikes on Iran. Due to the internet shutdown, the war, and the Iranian government preventing many foreign journalists from working in the country, it is difficult to assess the full extent of the protests or the killings carried out by the state. Reported casualty figures range from 5,000 to 20,000 and higher, with tens of thousands said to have been arrested and many subjected to torture and mistreatment.
The Board would appreciate public comments that address:
- How social media platforms should detect and address online influence operations, especially those carried out on behalf of states.
- How state-sponsored online influence operations typically operate, especially with respect to Meta’s platforms.
- The impact of pro-Iranian government propaganda and online influence operations on Iranian civilians, particularly in the context of the recent protests.
- How the Iranian government and its supporters use social media, as well as whether and how they use coded threats or incitement to violence.
In its decisions, the Board can issue policy recommendations to Meta. While recommendations are not binding, Meta must respond to them within 60 days. As such, the Board welcomes public comments proposing recommendations that are relevant to these cases.
